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Social relationsBased on an offline and online survey of 967 people of Turkish origin living in these
countries, we test how legacy and social media have influenced the participation of the
members of the Turkish diaspora in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands in the
mid-2013 protests in Turkey’s social movement referred to as Gezi Park. This study also
investigates how living in Europe can influence the behavior and attitudes of the sampled
individuals from the Turkish Diaspora of Germany, Belgium and Netherlands during the
period when the Gezi Park demonstration took place. Our results make it clear that social
media were used by those who supported the protest movement, while those who opposed
the protest movement primarily used or followed traditional sources of media, including
Turkish and European television. Furthermore, supporters amongst the diaspora for the
Gezi-protests were primarily active in accruing social capital through bonding and social
networking among those who belong to the Turkish diaspora under the guise of the Gezi
Park protests. Finally, a significant number of the supporters of the protests in the three
countries took part in several different means of supporting the movement, including: dis-
seminating awareness about the Gezi protests through social media, engaging in meetings,
and in some cases, even severing contact with friends and acquaintances who did not share
their support for the protest movement.
 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Civil protests and alternative forms of participation in social movements are gaining popularity and are often seen as
signs of democratic health (Norris, 2002). While some Internet researchers demonstrate the empowering potential of online
social media, others are commentators who find it naive to believe in their politically liberating power (Gladwell, 2010;
Jones, 2011; Coenen et al., 2012). Turkey’s restrictive Internet policies and surveillance legislation, which included their
resultant blocking by the state of nearly 79,898 different web sites* since the Gezi protests began, are examples of a regime
bent on thwarting their revolutionary potential (Akdeniz, 2010; Krajeski, 2010). The protests that began in Istanbul’s Gezi Park
in May 2013 and the use of legacy media and social media in the relations between civil society and the state are central in thisn).
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engage in or stay away from this social movement, taking place far from their European homes.
According to Tilly (2004), who was writing before the emergence of social media, protest is primarily perceived through
the media in terms of ‘worthiness’, ‘unity’, ‘numbers’, and ‘commitment’ (WUNC); these are the defining elements of social
movements and the basic concepts for measuring their strength. The higher the protest scores as determined by police or
other official sources on these characteristics, the higher their impact (Lohmann, 1993). In concrete terms,many participants
making worthy claims, sharing common symbols and goals, and committed to resist repression, are more likely to be success-
ful. This study further elaborates on these ‘WUNC’ characteristics, applying them to the Gezi Protests as seen by ‘members of
the Turkish diaspora’ in Western Europe.
Generally speaking, this study provides some concrete evidence about the role of social media in a social movement from
the perspective of a diaspora’s engagement. It is based on an offline and online survey of the attitudes and behaviors of
members of Turkish diasporic members in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany during the Gezi Park protests in the early
summer of 2013. Owing to the impossibility of locating a random sample of participants with Turkish ethnicity, we used a
variety of online and offline recruiting tools to reach potential respondents (Ogan et al., in press). Participation in activist
forums was not required for survey completion as we solicited both respondents who passively or actively participated in
the protests and those who were opposed to such protests. In all, 967 questionnaires were completed.
This research further operationalizes the social capital concept in the context of social media being used for political
mobilization, by looking at both bridging and bonding social capital (Ellison et al., 2011). We investigate whether or not
the diasporic ‘group’ under scrutiny accrued communication-generated social capital through the use of legacy and social
media. Our study will introduce the use of social media for activist purposes within a diasporic context to the literature
on social capital. Using social media for activist purposes among the Turkish diaspora may lead to new opportunities
(e.g., stronger sense of (be)longing and community feeling). In addition to the examination of social capital, during a time
of intense focus on the country of ethnic origin by a group of European residents or citizens, this study examines in contrast
the European context for respondents’ attitudes and behaviors.2. Context for the study
On themorning ofMay 31, 2013 people in Turkey witnessed the largest civil unrest in the country’s recent history. OnMay
28, some 50 activists gathered in Gezi Park in central Istanbul to protest an urban development plan that called for the destruc-
tion of an urban park situated next to Taksim Square, in Istanbul, and replacing it with a shoppingmall designed to resemble a
faux Ottoman-style ‘‘military barracks” (Yuksek, 2014). After a few days, the small environmentalist protest escalated into a
countrywide uprising against PrimeMinister Erdog˘an’s government owing to its confrontational approach towards protesters,
including liberal useof tear gas,water cannonsand ‘‘harmless” plasticbullets by thepolice aswell as nationalmedia censorship.
Out of a population of 80 million, an estimated 3.5 million Turkish people actively took part in almost 5000 demonstrations
across the country; 11 people were killed and more than 8000 were injured (De Bellaigue, 2013).
According to an online poll by Istanbul Bilgi University, 91.3% of respondents said they became involved in demonstra-
tions because of the prime minister’s authoritarianism, with a similar percentage indicating they were protesting police
violence. The third reason for the demonstrations was the violation of democratic rights (91.1%) followed by the ‘silencing
of the media’ (84.2%) (Yuksek, 2014). Mainstream national television channels, both public and private, either refused to
cover the demonstrations or under-reported the scale of the events (Yuksek, 2014).
Out of outrage with the silencing of the mainstream media, new online media platforms emerged that played an impor-
tant role in providing a more accurate description of events and raising public awareness in real time. In other words, they
supplied a significant communication function for the exchange of ideas and the formulation of collective public opinion,
enhancing citizens’ ability to organize and tell the country and the outside world about the events (Barberá, 2013). In con-
trast to the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings, which garnered huge international interest, social media activity during the Gezi Park
protests indicate a clear national focus. For example, only three out of ten tweets relating to events in Egypt were posted
by those on the ground, whereas approximately nine out of ten tweets relating to Gezi Park were posted from Turkey, with
a similar proportion of tweets being written in Turkish. About half of the tweets were located to Istanbul specifically, further
suggesting that the target was a Turkish audience and not globally oriented (Devitt, 2013; Varol et al., 2014).
Participation in the social media campaign was not just confined to Turkey, however. Tweets flooded in from all over the
world about the protests, out of which nearly 15% of the tweets were from other countries (Varol et al., 2014; Barberá, 2013).
The demonstrations received both support and opposition from members of the Turkish diaspora, with others choosing to
remain silent. Many ‘offline’ activities, such as street demonstrations, took place across the globe in support of the protesters
in Turkey. These activities supplemented online activities that intended to increase awareness among the diaspora. Diasporic
involvement was notable in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, three countries with a sizeable Turkish minority and
characterized by similar shifts in the immigrant-receiving policy. Nearly three million people of Turkish descent reside in
Germany (half of them are part of the first generation, and overall they are making up 3.6% of the total German population)
(Wolf, 2014). This compares similarly to the Netherlands, where 400,000 people of Turkish descent reside, amounting to 2.5%
of the population (Statistics Netherlands, 2014), and Belgium, where there are 218,832 people of Turkish descent or almost
2% of the population (Dukes, 2012).
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the involvement of diasporic activism in political changes in ‘the old country’ as well as the affinities with Turkey and people
from Turkey. To our knowledge, this is the first survey examining the perspectives on the Gezi protest movement from the
margins, i.e. the Turkish diaspora residing in Western Europe.
2.1. Understanding the Gezi Park protest as a social movement
Charles Tilly (2004, 2006) introducedWUNC as an acronym to describe social movements, in reference to the participants’
and their constituencies’ public representations of ‘worthiness’, ‘unity’, ‘numbers’ and ‘commitment’. According to Tilly ‘wor-
thiness’ refers to, among other things, presence of clergy, dignitaries and mothers with children. Indicators of ‘unity’ would
be matching badges, headbands, banners, or costumes, singing and chanting. ‘Numbers’ refer to headcounts, signatures on
petitions, messages from constituents, people taking to the streets, and ‘commitment’ would consist of braving bad weather,
visible participation by the old and people with disabilities, resistance to repression, ostentatious sacrifice, subscription, and/
or benefaction. Tilly argues that only the movements that are mostly involved with the display of worthiness, unity, numbers
and commitment should rightly be called ‘social movements’. Although the Gezi Park protests initially demonstrated high
levels of all four characteristics, the ‘unity’ and ‘commitment’ of the movement diminished noticeably as it lost impetus
and individuals returned to their daily lives (Aknur, 2014). However, there were serious reasons for this—notably the threat
of bodily harm from the police (both in uniform and undercover) and of imprisonment. Also, people were encouraged to
report their neighbors to the authorities if they witnessed them undertaking any actions that would support the demonstra-
tions (banging pots or hanging banners/flags).
The ‘social movement repertoire’ is one of the elements through which Tilly describes ‘combinations of different forms of
political action, such as vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteer-
ing’. In the Gezi Park protests, immediately after police launched their first early morning assault on May 30, crowds from
other Istanbul neighborhoods converged on Taksim Square in the thousands, even though all public transport routes had
been shut down (Aknur, 2014). In a large number of cities, wide-ranging demonstrations involved people from various
groups and social classes: the young, old, secular, religious, socialists, communists, liberals, anti-capitalist Muslims, Turkish
and Kurdish nationalists; gay and lesbian rights advocates; as well as football fans of Istanbul’s three major teams (Aknur,
2014; Kotsev, 2013). At 9 p.m. daily, many different groups showed their support in a range of ways: people with very young
and elderly relatives joined demonstration marches in their communities and others expressed their protest from balconies
by banging pots and bans. By mid-June, international support was growing, particularly among areas of Europe with large
Turkish communities. This support was expressed through social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, but also
through public gatherings and protest marches (Aknur, 2014).
2.2. The role of (social) media and cyber-activism in social movements
High profile political actions during the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions as well as the recent Gezi Park movement in Turkey have
led media scholars to focus on the role of online social media in political mobilization and mass social change (see for
example (Stepanova, 2011; Howard and Hussain, 2011; Gerbaudo, 2012; Lim, 2012; Corke et al., 2014).
Responses to the rapid surge in protests and the roles played by digital media in various types of mass movements have
divided critics into opposing camps. On the one hand, there are those who welcome online communication platforms as
liberating forces; on the other hand, there are those who see them as tools increasingly used by state authorities to identify,
locate, and silence individuals and groups opposing the establishment (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). Thus ‘cyber-skeptics’
view the favorable impact of online social media as overstated, saying that they have not successfully realized their predicted
potential in terms of organized activity and individual participation in mass movements (Gladwell, 2010). And
‘cyber-utopians’ argue that online social media can indeed help to initiate and promote collective actions and act as a means
of organization, amplifying a movement’s message and its international impact (Jones, 2011; Coenen et al., 2012).
Bennett and Segerberg (2012) have developed the concept of ‘connective action’ as distinct from classic ‘collective action’
to account for the new dynamics evident in organizational structures and for different forms of mobilization, all of which are
entirely dependent on modern communication methods. Some of the key distinctive features of connective action are that
activists use a combination of social media and real world actions, like meetings, protests, and key location occupations, to
maintain and build momentum. For many activists, this is their first time participating in such political or social movements.
Developments in technology and online communication allow disparate and unaffiliated groups and individuals to commu-
nicate and distribute information without the necessity of belonging to organizations such as political parties or labor
unions, for instance (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012).
The Gezi Park protests came to symbolize the pivotal role that social media can play in mobilizing people and organizing
civil protests. The conspicuous absence of coverage of these events by news outlets emphasized the importance of social
media in recording and publicizing the movement. It also served to extend the outreach to others opposing the policies
of civil authorities, the established media, and their corporate associates (Atak, 2013). Social media was integral to the
development of the movement arising from the Gezi Park protests; it provided a foundation from which participants could
organize events and coordinate actions, and from which more formal groups developed. All of this increased the movement’s
cohesion and integrity, and helped awareness and support of the cause to spread internationally (Tufekci, 2014).
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nationally about the protest in Turkey and fostered support against the Turkish government. In the face of the media’s refusal
to cover the Gezi movement, Turkish nationals abroad were driven to organize events to raise awareness and to demonstrate
their support for their fellow nationals at home. Activists in the diaspora were helpful in spreading information, supplying
encouragement, and shaping the global perception of the Gezi uprising. The diaspora activists served as liaisons, transmitting
information between those directly involved in the movement and the international news media. They also became involved
in protests by amplifying the voices of local protesters in the outside world. They bridged the gap between social media and
mainstream media, and collaborated actively with members of the news media, assisting with the linguistic and cultural
translation of documents and messages for international audiences (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti, 2013).
The Gezi Park movement has thus given rise to novel media uses in Turkey: the revolt was one of the first to make sub-
stantial use of social media (Twitter, Facebook, blogs), and never before had a protest moment in Turkey been able to control
events to this extent or have their demands acknowledged in this way. The surge in viewing figures and readership numbers
for anti-establishment broadcasts and print media in reaction to the attitude of the pro-government media outlets was
striking (Gezgin et al., 2014). The most remarkable and unprecedented feature of the movement was the enormous increase
in tweets and Twitter users during the events at Gezi Park: 384,000 people joined Twitter every month in 2012; new users
reached 660,000 in June 2013; and in the aftermath of the movement about 500,000 accounts were created per month
(Kesen, 2014; Turkoglu and Caren, 2014).
Unquestionably, socialmedia platforms have provided away for citizens to reach out and secure assistance and support for
their movement, whether through connecting with human rights groups or motivating the wider public to participate (Tung,
2011). However, the benefits of turning to social media for political purposes are not limited to those advocating for human
rights or the civil good. The effectiveness and influence of social media during such events are integrally linked to the specific
social and political context inwhich they are occurring (El-NawawyandKhamis, 2012). Socialmedia provide venues for strate-
gies by anti-establishment movements but also by state authorities. State agents use social media platforms for information
gathering and monitoring, and other groups who oppose the movement in question also maintain an active presence there.
2.3. How are social media shaping social capital?
Scholars have looked at social media as a way of facilitating the increase of social capital by individuals. Social capital is an
ambiguous, multidimensional concept whose definition has varied considerably and as yet, no precise consensus has been
reached regarding what it represents (Bourdieu, 1980; Coleman, 1988). Putnam (2000) argues that ‘civicness’ or the percep-
tion of civic engagement is central to the meaning of social capital. He describes social capital as a network that exists
between members of the community which allows individuals to forgo personal priorities and to work as a group towards
shared objectives and common goals. Putnam (2000) identifies two types of social capital: ‘bonding capital’ and ‘bridging
capital’. Bonding capital describes ‘inward networks that tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups’,
while bridging capital signifies open networks that are ‘outward looking and encompass people across diverse social
cleavages’. Bonding capital consists of strong ties that are also referred to as protection networks and these are a source
of unstructured social support; bridging capital consists of weak ties that underlie innovation networks essential for social
and professional progression and for expanding the range of available information (Granovetter, 1973; Barr, 1998; Putnam,
2000). This distinction is important as it provides a more accurate understanding of the social impact of communication
through social media platforms and the Internet.
Further, Brinkerhoff (2009) argues that online communication networks connect outlying populations to more densely
populated centers. This makes it possible for widespread groups to establish unity and for each group to speak on behalf
of the larger movement. The Internet can be used to monitor progress and accomplishments, sustaining engaged participa-
tion and encouraging additional recruitment. Essentially, the Internet provides a structured foundation for organization and
communication. In addition to effective information dissemination, this foundation increases the perceived magnitude and
influence of the movement. It also connects a wide range of interested groups despite regional and social boundaries, result-
ing in the cohesion of disparate elements into a substantial body of social capital, or at least that is the hope.
It is enlightening to account for bridging and bonding differences as well as for online and offline dissimilarities,
especially when the range offered by the Internet is quite encompassing. Williams (2006) argues that conflicting views of
the impact of social media and the Internet on building social capital result from a failure to distinguish between online
and offline social capital. According to Williams (2006), the majority of the research demonstrating the detrimental impact
of Internet usage on social capital concerns the bonding of social capital offline. However, Internet use can also result in the
accumulation of additional social capital (Ellison et al., 2011; Hofer and Aubert, 2013): through the Internet, it is possible to
establish connections between activists who have never met in person. In other words, new networks can be created through
the Internet, thus producing online bridging social capital.
Unsurprisingly, the role of socialmedia in political participation and thedevelopment of socialmovements is currently a hot
topic in academic circles. Through an offline and online survey in three European countries, this study will contribute to the
literature by focusing on the role ofmainstreamand socialmedia platforms in a socialmovement fromadiasporic engagement
perspective, as well as their role in instigating, covering and organizing the Gezi Park movement abroad. Building on the liter-
ature on social movements, their description based on Tilly’s WUNC model, the use of social media for political mobilization
purposes, and the role of social media in social capital building, this study aims to assess the positions of the Turkish diaspora
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mainstream and social media, their (cyber) activism or lack thereof, and their building of social capital through social media.
This leads us to the following research questions:
RQ1: What are the profiles of the pro-Gezi and anti-Gezi members of the Turkish diaspora in Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands?
RQ2: How have diaspora members made use of legacy media and social media before and during the Gezi Park protests?
RQ3: What kinds of social relations have emerged as a result of the Gezi Park protests?
RQ4: What kinds of social activities have emerged as a result of the Gezi Park protests?
3. Methodology
This study is part of a bigger research project dealing with the roles of network structure and dynamics in social capital
building among Turkish diasporic members. This study visualizes online and offline networks of these phenomena in three
European countries. The research is divided into four studies and a multi-method approach is proposed. For data collection, a
multi-step process is employed that begins with offline and online surveys to locate the target population and collects their
online network information via their twitter accounts. Large-scale user network and profile data collection are used to map
the target population’s online networks and discover the structural and relational attributes of their networks, measuring the
role of influential people via their positions (as hubs and bridges) in the networks and the number of retweets. Following
that, in-depth interviews are conducted with key players to understand their motivations and experiences while tweeting
during the Gezi protests, with an attempt to gauge its effect on social networks and building social capital by mapping their
offline personal networks.
Our research mainly focused on the use of both legacy media and social media platforms by the Turkish and Kurdish
diaspora, their attitudes and behaviors regarding the Gezi Park protests, and the role of the protests in their social capital
building activities (maintaining social relations and undertaking social activities in their countries of residence and Turkey).
Given the lack of reliable and comprehensive statistics our main challenge was to locate members of the Turkish diaspora
(i.e. first generation immigrants of Kurdish/Turkish origin, their descendants, and students who came to Europe for study)
offline as well as online. The snowball sampling method was used to gather our respondents, who completed the survey
in one of four language versions: offline data collection occurred in Turkish neighborhoods and at meetings and social gath-
erings of Turkish organizations, while online data collection was carried out through Qualtrics links on Facebook group pages
and ethnic organizations’ websites.
The self-administered questionnaires were conducted both online and offline and included 64 open- and closed-ended
questions intended to measure legacy and social media use, the role of social media in the Gezi protests, and the impact of
the Gezi Park movement on the respondents’ social relations and activities after the protests. The survey began in November
2013,with data from967 respondents being collecteduntil the end ofMay2014. The results of this study show that the respon-
dentswere not likely to be first generation diasporamembers—and in factmore likely to be second or third generation,many of
whom remained in the country upon completion of their studies. The number of respondentswas almost the same in the three
countries under scrutiny (n = 332 (34.3%) in Belgium; n = 315 (32.6%) in the Netherlands, and n = 320 (33.1%) in Germany).
Several variables were used to measure, quantify and test the research questions. Socio-demographic characteristics such
as gender, age, occupational status, marital status, educational level, number of years spent living in Europe, language used
daily to speak with family, and sense of belonging to a religion were used to describe the respondents’ general profiles. The
attitude of the respondents towards the Gezi Park movement was measured through a variable based on participation in the
protests on social media and in other ways. The social media use profile was measured through multiple variables related to
the use of legacy and social media before and during the Gezi Park protests.
Social relations and activities before and during the Gezi Park movement were measured through variables related to
either the decline or increase of the diaspora’s formal and informal social relations and activities before and during the
protests. The survey included several questions meant to find out whether there had been an increase in the respondents’
face-to-face and online relationships with Turkey, with people from Turkey living in Europe, and with their host society
and country. Additionally, as a way to test the impact of the Gezi Park movement on their social ties and social capital,
we asked respondents whether they had joined any new organizations and whether their activities in Turkish organizations
had increased in the aftermath of the protests.
Finally, univariate and bivariate statistical analyses were run to understand the composition as well as the between-
group comparison of the sample, and to identify relevant correlations between the variables under study.4. Research findings
4.1. Profile of the Turkish diaspora
The demographics of the three groups are significantly different, with faith being the most prominent (see Table 1). One in
three (30.5%) of the respondents indicated being in opposition to the movement, while 16.8% were passive and 49.3% active
Table 1
Profiles of the supporters and opponents of the Gezi Park protests in diaspora.
Characteristics Total
%
Opponent
%
Passive support
%
Active support
%
Test/Sig
Gender
Female 46.8 43.4 38.3 52.2 X2 = 11.678
Male 53.8 56.6 61.7 47.8 P = 0.003
Age
20 10.4 15.8 11.3 6.8 X2 = 44.739
20–29 45.1 51.9 42.1 41.9 P = 0.000
30–39 24.0 18.9 25.2 26.8
40–49 11.8 10.7 8.2 13.8
50+ 8.6 2.7 13.2 10.6
Mean 31 28 32 33
Marital status 37.9 35.9 37.7 39.2 n.s
Single 37.9 35.9 37.7 39.2
Married 62.1 64.1 62.3 60.8
Occupation status
Employed 44.9 34.3 42.5 52.0 X2 = 22.515
Unemployed 7.3 6.7 10.4 6.5 P = 0.000
Student 47.9 59.0 47.0 41.5
Level of education
Primary school or less 2.1 1.4 3.1 2.3 X2 = 50.741
High school or less 9.0 9.2 11.7 8.0 P = 0.000
Completed high school 15.1 18.6 14.2 13.2
Undergraduate degree or less 35.2 42.0 38.3 30.0
Master’s degree or less 29.1 25.8 28.4 31.4
Ph.D. degree or less 9.4 3.1 4.3 15.1
Country of living
Belgium 34.4 29.2 44.4 34.2 X2 = 27.911
The Netherlands 32.1 42.0 28.4 27.3 P < 0.000
Germany 33.5 28.8 27.2 38.6
Length of stay
5 years and less 18.1 2.7 16.8 28.1 X2 = 107.404
6–10 8.6 4.8 9.3 10.8 P = 0.000
11–20 18.6 21.3 19.3 16.7
21–30 36.7 53.3 34.2 27.4
Higher than 30 17.9 17.9 20.5 17.1
Mean 21 23 21 19
Languages spoken at home
Turkish or Kurdish 66.4 52.2 65.2 74.3 X2 = 77.473
Turkish + Dutch, French and German 30.3 47.3 27.0 22.3 P = 0.000
German, Dutch, French, English 3.3 0.5 7.8 3.4
Sense of belonging to religion
Yes 64.4 94.5 72.9 44.3 X2 = 400.758
No 7.0 2.0 9.0 9.3 P = 0.000
Uncertain 28.6 3.6 18.1 46.4
Total(N) 934 295 162 477
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of the spectrum.
Our respondents ranged from 17 to 75 years of age (mean age 31), with the largest group aged 20–29 (45.1%). Anti- and
pro-Gezi groups differed significantly in as much as the average age of the anti-Gezi group (28) was lower than that of the
passive (32) or active (33) pro-Gezi groups. Three in four respondents (73.7%) were college graduates with almost half
employed (44.9%). There were significant between-group differences given that 59% of the Gezi opponents were students,
alongside 34.3% employed respondents. By way of comparison, one in two Gezi supporters (52%) was employed, followed
by students (41.5%). There were more Gezi opponents (42%) in the Netherlands than in Belgium (29.2%) and Germany
(28.8%) among our respondents. The group of active supporters was higher in Germany (38.6%) than in Belgium (34.2%)
and in the Netherlands (27.3%), while passive supporters mostly live in Belgium (44.4%) compared to the Netherlands
(28.4%) and Germany (27.2%).
Our respondents’ average number of years spent in Europe is 21 years. The figure is higher for the anti-Gezi group
(23 years on average) than for the passive (21 years) and active supporters (19 years on average). The Turkish and Kurdish
languages (66.4%) are the dominant languages spoken at home, with only 3.3% of the respondents using the language of the
country of residence in the domestic sphere. Active (74.3%) and passive Gezi supporters (65.2%) seem to speak Turkish or
Kurdish more often than Gezi opponents (52.2%).
554 R. Imani Giglou et al. / Telematics and Informatics 34 (2017) 548–559In regards to faith, 64.4% reported a sense of belonging to a religion, while 28.6% percent were uncertain and only 7% said
theywere not at all religious. Therewas clear heterogeneity amongst the groups, as the anti-Gezi group (94.5%) and the passive
pro-Gezi group (72.9%) were more likely to consider themselves Muslim or affiliated with that or any other faith, compared
with the active supporters who indicated adherence to either some religion (44.3%), or exhibited no certainty (46.4%) about it.
4.2. Social media use
Coming to the core focus of our study, results of both the chi-squared and Kruskal-Wallis H tests displayed notable dif-
ferences in specific media use among Gezi opponents and Gezi active and passive supporters (Table 2).
Gezi opponents used the Internet (H(2) = 14.749, p = 0.001) and watched both Turkish television (H(2) = 79.3232,
p = 0.000) and European-based television (H(2) = 43.737, p = 0.000) more frequently than Gezi active and passive supporters
did. The passive Gezi supporters only chose European (H(2) = 20.332, p = 0.000) newspapers as their primary medium. TheTable 2
Media use profiles.
Opponent
%
Passive support
%
Active support
%
Test/Sig
Internet use frequently
All/most of the time 68.1 55.3 66.7 H = 14.749
Mean rank (435.97) (530.92) (458.49) P < 0.001
Have a twitter account
Yes 63.1 48.4 64.6 X2 = 10.778
No 36.9 51.6 35.4 P = 005
Where they first heard about Gezi
Facebook 31.4 35.2 50.6
Twitter 7.2 10.5 10.5 X2 = 111.141
Newspaper 5.9 5.6 5.7 P = 0.000
TV 44.1 28.4 13.7
Turkish newspaper reading online/offline
Every day/nearly every day 55.4 56.2 55.5 n.s
(477.09) (457.90) (460.98)
European newspaper reading online/offline
Every day/Nearly every day 56.2 59.6 39.6 H = 20.332
Mean rank (429.25) (419.63) (503.17) P = 0.000
Turkish television viewing
Several hours/day 64.3 47.2 34.6 H = 79.323
Mean rank (358.12) (461.25) (531.47) P = 0.000
European television viewing
Several hours/day 54.8 42.1 34.5 H = 43.737
Mean rank (381.93) (451.18) (509.17) P = 0.000
News channel of choice
Turkish/Non-Turkish/Both 34.4 36.8 37.1 Turkish – n.s.
Use of social media
Most of time 35.1 39.2 57.6 H = 55.935
Mean rank (445.70) (441.73) (332.92) P = 0.000
Use of legacy media
Most of time 43.6 48.2 41.6 n.s.
(393.36) (384.57) (421.91)
Where they follow news of Gezi (all of the time/most of the time)
Facebook 78.4 78.1 93.6 H = 119.930
Mean rank (527.64) (509.62) (361.29) P = 0.000
Twitter 41.8 43.8 63.3 H = 48.415
Mean rank (419.95) (400.89) (310,93) P = 0.000
Newspaper 51.7 53.4 55.3 n.s.
(410.14) (383.04) (377.41)
TV 82.5 65.2 57.2 H = 26.411
Mean rank (365.36) (441.98) (455.67) P = 0.000
Increase during Gezi of online media use
Facebook 38.4 49.7 86.2 H = 91.942
Mean rank (526.42) (475.24) (363.36) P = 0.000
Twitter 27.6 36.1 59.3 H = 208.757
Mean rank (580.41) (519.47) (350.86) P = 0.000
Online forums 5.7 20.1 42.7 H = 169.887
Mean rank (570.13) (466.03) (345.87) P = 0.000
Table 3
Opinion of the supporters and opponents of the Gezi Park protests related to media coverage of the Gezi Park protests in Turkey and Europe.
Media coverage Total
%
Opponent
%
Passive support
%
Active support
%
Turkish media
Coverage is reliable and objective 9.5 25.3 5.0 1.3
Reporting is one-sided 51.1 35.2 45.3 62.8
Not all aspects of Gezi news included 19.7 30.4 24.8 11.3
Insufficient news of Gezi included 17.4 6.5 19.3 23.5
Don’t follow Turkish press 2.4 2.7 5.6 1.1
X2 = 220.306 P = 0.000
European media
Coverage is reliable and objective 26.8 1.7 22.6 43.7
Reporting is one-sided 34.2 78.5 25.2 9.9
Not all aspects of Gezi news included 24.0 14.3 30.2 27.8
Insufficient news of Gezi included 12.4 2.4 20.8 15.8
Don’t follow Turkish press 2.6 3.1 1.3 2.7
X2 = 429.030 P = 0.000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
On May 29 following the Prime Minister’s speech reinforcing his 
decision related to the Gezi Park police acon
Others
On May 30 when the police intervenon grew more severe
I don’t know/remember
On May 28 following the intervenon by the police
On May 27 when bulldozers moved in to remove the park’s trees
2.4 %
6.3 %
7.3 %
9.9 %
23.3 %
50.8 %
Fig. 1. When did one hear about the Gezi Park protests?
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(2) = 208.757, p = 0.000) and online forums (H(2) = 169.887, p = 0.000) during the Gezi movement. Furthermore, all of the
three groups turned to different legacy media and social media to keep abreast of the Gezi Park protests: the pro-Gezi pro-
testers used Facebook (H(2) = 119.930, p = 0.000) and Twitter (H(2) = 48.415, p = 0.000) more often than anti Gezi and pas-
sive support groups did. The anti-Gezi group only favored television (H(2) = 26.411, p = 0.000) to follow news.4.3. Perceived credibility of Turkish and European media coverage
Previous research has shown that Turkish media censorship was one of the main drivers of the Gezi Park movement
(Tunç, 2014). Criticism began on the first night of clashes between protestors and police, when CNN-Turk aired a documen-
tary about penguins while battles raged in the streets. We asked respondents about their opinion of the coverage of the Gezi
Park movement by the Turkish and European media and found significant differences among the three groups (Table 3).
Unsurprisingly, the active support group (62.8%) uncovered more bias in the Turkish media than the passive support group
(45.3%) and opponents (35.2%) respectively. Considerably more Gezi opponents (25.3%) saw the media as reliable and objec-
tive compared to the passive (5%) and active support group (1.3%). With respect to European media coverage, 78.5% of the
Gezi opponents found European media to be biased, compared to only 25.2% of the Gezi passive supports and 9.9% of the Gezi
active supporters, who found European media to be more trustworthy.
Approximately half of the respondents (50.8%) reported hearing about the Gezi Park protests for the first time on May 27
when the bulldozers rolled into the park to clear its trees. One in four (23.3%) became aware of the incidents on May 28th
after the police intervention. The rest learnt about it later, in the aftermath of the Prime Minister’s speech and the harsh
police repression, extensively covered by the Western media (see Fig. 1).
Table 4a
Types of social activities and relations that emerged from the Gezi Park protests (in %).
Social capital Total
%
Anti-Gezi
%
Pro-Gezi
%
Social activities
I encouraged people to participate in the Gezi Park protests
through social media
Agree 50.1 3.9 71.5
Neither agree/disagree 13.9 13.3 14.1
Disagree 36.0 82.8 14.3
I invited others to participate in the protests in person or
by telephone
Agree 30.5 3.9 43.3
Neither agree/disagree 20.8 11.6 25.2
Disagree 48.7 84.6 31.5
I participated in offline forums alongside with the protests Agree 27.3 4.6 38.2
Neither agree/disagree 21.8 14.8 25.2
Disagree 50.9 80.6 24.8
Social relations
I removed friends who did not support the protests from
my friend list on social media or I cut face-to-face contact
Agree 19.0 5.7 25.4
Neither agree/disagree 17.0 13.4 18.8
Disagree 64.0 80.9 55.8
My connections with Turkey have increased during the
Gezi Park protests
Agree 42.8 18.8 54.1
Neither agree/disagree 23.9 23.0 24.4
Disagree 33.3 58.2 21.5
My connections with people from turkey living in Europe have
increased during the protests
Agree 38.2 13.9 49.5
Neither agree/disagree 27.7 27.8 27.7
Disagree 34.1 58.4 22.8
In my daily life, I have face-to-face interactions with people from
turkey living in Europe more than with others
Agree 33.9 27.3 37.0
Neither agree/disagree 31.3 27.3 33.2
Disagree 34.8 45.4 29.8
In my daily life I have face-to-face interactions with those who are
native to the country where I live more than with those of Turkish
Agree 35.5 22.2 41.5
Neither agree/disagree 36.2 32.2 38.1
Disagree 28.5 45.5 20.4
Formal ties
During the Gezi park protests, have you attended meetings of
associations, that you are a member of, more than you did before?
Yes, it has increased 10.4 3.8 13.5
No, it has not changed 26.0 34.5 22.1
Yes, I joined an association 3.1 1.4 3.9
I am not a member of any association 60.5 60.3 60.6
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The results of Table 4a show that Gezi supporters (71.5%) encouraged people to participate in the Gezi Park protests
through social media, an activity in which opponents did not engage. Unsurprisingly, Gezi opponents did not call on people
to take part in the protests either in person or otherwise. The pro-Gezi group comprised of people (43.3%) who actively sent
out invitations, and of people (25.2%) who were hesitant in inviting people to participate in the Gezi park protests in person
or by phone. The pro-Gezi group also had a higher percentage of members (38.2%) who participated in offline forums along
with the protests. The survey asked respondents whether they had removed friends who did not support the protests from
their online social media accounts. Although both groups generally denied this, a fair number (25.4%) of Gezi supporters
answered the question in the affirmative. Clearly, most of the Gezi supporters (54.1%) felt that their connections with Turkey
had increased during the protests; the opponents who mainly disagreed obviously did not feel this. Similar results for Gezi
supporters (49.5%) were observed when respondents were asked if their connections with people from Turkey and with
Turks living in Europe had increased during the protests; again the opponents did not feel that connections had increased.
Compared to Gezi opponents (27.3%), more supporters (37.0%) acknowledged having experienced more face-to-face interac-
tions with people from Turkey living in Europe than with people of non-Turkish origin. Overall, the pattern of responses to
most of our questions demonstrates that Gezi supporters were greatly active in accruing bonding social capital and social
relations among Turkish diasporic members under the banner of the Gezi park protests, a trend that was absent among
the opponents of the protests. The opponents of the Gezi protests showed little indication of accruing bonding social capital,
as they seemed not to be influenced by the Gezi park protests in the way the supporters were influenced.
The results obtained from both the t-test and the Mann-Whitney test point to significant differences between Gezi sup-
porters and opponents with respect to their accruing social capital, as particularly exemplified by the questions inquiring
about their social relations and activities (see Table 4b). For all the questions, except the one pertaining to attendance at
the meetings of organizations, the mean rank of the pro-Gezi group is higher than that of the anti-Gezi group. The high
U-values provided in the table along with the corresponding significant P-values suggest that the pro-Gezi group was more
involved in social activities and promoting social relations than their opponents. Unsurprisingly, the opponents disagreed
with the question inquiring about their involvement in attempts to intensify their social capital in terms of social activities
and relations by reaching out to other members in the diaspora during the Gezi park protests.
Table 4b
Types of social activities and relations that emerged from the Gezi Park protests.
Social capital Total mean Anti-
Gezi
mean
Pro-
Gezi
mean
Anti-
Gezi
mean
rank
Pro-
Gezi
mean
rank
Mann-
Whitney U
test
T-Test
Social activities
I encouraged people to participate in the Gezi Park protests
through social media
3.12 2.21 3.57 212.21 560.93 U = 155.549
P = 0.000
F = 92.534
P = 0.000
I invited others to participate in the protests in person or by
telephone.
2.80 2.19 3.12 270.96 522.31 U = 133.390
P = 0.000
F = 258.016
P = 0.000
I participated in offline forums alongside with the protests 2.76 2.24 3.02 294.68 506.51 U = 124.328
P = 0.000
F = 155.061
P = 0.000
Social relations
I removed friends who did not support the protests from my
friend list on social media or I cut face-to-face contact
2.54 2.25 2.70 354.51 473.87 U = 105.696
P = 0.000
F = 218.553
P = 0.000
My connections with Turkey have increased during the Gezi
Park protests.
3.08 2.61 3.33 306.50 501.80 U = 121.259
P = 0.000
F = 0.947
P = 0.000
My connections with people from Turkey living in Europe have
increased during the protests.
3.02 2.56 3.27 305.06 505.92 U = 123.062
P = 0.000
F = 9.619
P = 0.000
In my daily life, I have face-to-face interactions with people
from Turkey living in Europe more than with others.
2.98 2.82 3.07 390.37 463.44 U = 98.172
P = 0.000
F = 3.493
P = 0.000
In my daily life I have face-to-face interactions with those who
are native to the country where I live more than with those
of Turkish/Kurdish Origin
3.06 2.77 3.21 345.71 475.89 U = 106.660
P = 0.000
F = 2.495
P = 0.000
1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Disagree 3 = Neither
agree nor
disagree
4 = Agree 5 = Strongly agree
Formal ties
During the Gezi park protests, have you attended the meetings
of associations, that you are a member of, more than you did
before
1.63 1.49 1.70 437.82 458.61 U = 92.465
P = 0.201
1 = I am not a member of any association. 2 = No, it has not changed. 3 = Yes, I joined an association. 4 = Yes, it has increased.
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This study took up the international response to a protest movement’s diffusion across three countries among their Turk-
ish diasporic community, focusing on the role of mainstream media coverage as well as on the mediated and unmediated
connections of Turkish diasporic members with their ‘home’ country. At a disruptive moment like the Gezi Park protest
movement, the participants were susceptible to changing their existing attitudes and affinities with the ‘home’ and ‘receiv-
ing’ societies.
Faith proved to be a prominent distinguishing feature within our research group, characterized by heterogeneity. The
anti-Gezi and passive pro-Gezi respondents considered themselves more Muslim than the active Gezi supporter. This study,
dealing with a crisis moment, identified a re-bonding social capital trend among the Gezi protesters as members of the
European diaspora with Turkish people living in Europe and Turks in Turkey. In a nutshell, our results pointed in the follow-
ing directions: Gezi protest supporters socio-demographically comprised mainly people who had spent far less time living in
their corresponding EU country compared to the opponents, who mainly comprised people who had lived for more than
20 years in an EU country. The pro-Gezi supporters speak Turkish or Kurdish at home predominantly, while the opponents
also speak Dutch, French and German. These stark differences indicate that most of the opponents within the diaspora are
those who have spent large parts of their lives in an EU country and have integrated into the culture as the local language
proves to be the main language spoken at home, and this just might be an indication of distancing themselves from the Turk-
ish language. Overall, although opponents were most prominent in our Dutch subgroup, passive pro-Gezi supporters made
up the majority of our Belgian subsample and active pro-Gezi supporters were the most prominent in our German subgroup.
In terms of social media use, the use of online outlets was quite prominent among the Gezi protestors, which also
increased significantly during the Gezi protests. They heard about Gezi mainly through social media while the opponents
relied on television. Interestingly, opponents watched more Turkish as well as European Television than the Gezi supporters
did. Opponents, in contrast to supporters, also read offline and online European newspapers. This gives further evidence to
the proposition that the opponents mainly represented people integrated in the cultures of their respective host EU
countries.
Our study found that pro-Gezi supporters were strongly attached to Turkey, based on their socio-political attitudes. A fair
number of supporters participated in spreading awareness about the Gezi protests, engaged in meetings that increased after
the protests, and even cut off contact from social media friends who did not support the protests. The majority of opponents
did not participate in any activity pertaining to social capital building related to the Gezi protests. Hence, the opponents of
the Gezi protests are mostly young people, integrated in the European culture and less affected by the Gezi park protests. The
558 R. Imani Giglou et al. / Telematics and Informatics 34 (2017) 548–559Gezi protest supporters were generally engrossed in online social activities who voiced their anti-Turkish government views
throughout the protests.
Our research supports the theory of ‘‘connective actions” as discussed earlier by Bennett and Segerberg (2012) who dis-
tinguished the current social movement activity from the classic ‘‘collective action”. The authors argue that technology
enables actors to share cognitive resources and later circulate them across trusted social networks without having to address
formal conventional groups such as political parties and labor unions (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). Finally, the theories
were supported in our study through the use of social media platforms by key players to extend their social networks as well
as bridge and bond with their peers.
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